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Business development is once more at the
forefront of the agenda for Papua New
Guinea. After a decade where drought,
political instability and violence marred the
fortunes of the country, relative stability has
encouraged politicians and development
experts alike to renew support for business
development activities. In its Medium-Term
Development Strategy, the Government of
Papua New Guinea has nominated private-
sector led economic growth as its ‘number
one’ priority, emphasising the need for
entrepreneurial activity. The business
community in Papua New Guinea is
enthusiastic about the recognition and focus
it is now receiving, but is understandably
cautious about the ability of the government
to implement real and sustained changes that
can create a dynamic business environment.
The unholy trinity of law and order, lack
of infrastructure and persistent corruption
are often blamed for the lack of business
activity (outside the resource extraction
sector) in Papua New Guinea. While these
present significant disincentives to
entrepreneurs, both domestic and foreign,
they are features of many emerging markets
and fail to explain why business thrives in
some countries experiencing similar
constraints, such as the Philippines and
Indonesia, and not Papua New Guinea. The
Philippines is a particularly notable example
regarded by many business-risk assessment
agencies to be far more problematic than
Papua New Guinea (AON 2005), it is fast
becoming a significant investor in the fishing
and canning industries in Papua New
Guinea. The Philippines and Mexico are
regularly nominated as dangerous countries
in which to do business, as are many Central
and South American countries (AON 2005),
which nonetheless attract far more foreign
investment and business interest than Papua
New Guinea (Table 1). It seems that many of
the issues generally thought to be hindering
business development in Papua New
Guinea only partly explain the economic
stagnation of Papua New Guinea. There is a
deeper question of why, outside the resource
extraction industry, business fails to be
interested in Papua New Guinea, and what
can be done about it.
In response to this question, I recently
completed a series of discussions with
managers and business owners engaged in
small and medium sized business in Papua
New Guinea. Qualitative in nature, this
interview-based study was developed for
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AusAID and attempts to identify the most
significant impediments to businesses
outside the mining and forestry industries
in Papua New Guinea. All the businesses
studied had significant foreign investment,
and many commented on the fact that it is
now very difficult to attract foreign investor
interest in Papua New Guinea.
There is general agreement among
economists that foreign direct investment
(FDI) can be an important catalyst for
economic growth. FDI allows a country to
grow at a rate faster than would have been
possible with domestic savings alone, as it
mobilises capital that was not previously
available in the community. Foreign direct
investment has been shown to contribute to
economic growth in a host country primarily
through technology transfer, human capital
development and the ‘demonstration effect’
(whereby domestic entrepreneurs model their
operations on those of foreign investors,
effectively creating a hub of competing
industries).
An important attraction of foreign direct
investment to governments of developing
economies, as opposed to other types of capital
inflows, is the stability of foreign capital. The
main alternative source of private capital
inflow, portfolio investment (investments
made in financial products, such as shares,
bonds, money market instruments and
derivatives), is typically made in smaller
quantities, and is quickly and easily
withdrawn when economies show signs of
weakness. Portfolio investors are looking for
returns from financial products like bonds or
shares, and are more concerned with short-
Table 1 Total FDI inflow to developing economies, 1990–2003
Total FDI inflow Percentage of total Rank
(US$ million) developing country
inflows (per cent)
Developing economies 2,019,515 100.0
China 484,270 24.0 1
Hong Kong (ROC) 199,285 9.9 2
Brazil 181,187 9.0 3
Mexico 159,539 7.9 4
Singapore 133,383 6.6 5
Venezuela 33,120 1.6 13
India 28,606 1.4 14
Colombia 26,867 1.3 15
Philippines 17,539 0.9 20
Nigeria 16,283 0.8 22
Indonesia 13,594 0.7 23
Papua New Guinea 2,944 0.1 49
Fiji 533 - 95
Vanuatu 319 - 115
New Caledonia 109 - 127
Solomon Islands 75 - 130
Tonga 26 - 139
Kiribati 7 - 144
Source: UNCTAD Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment 2005.
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term profits than long-term operations. As a
result, the investor has no incentive to leave
money in the host country when economic
difficulties strike. Foreign direct investors take
a strategic interest in their investments. Such
investments often includes plant and
equipment, which is difficult to liquidate at
short notice. As longer-term investors, they
have goals that make short-term economic
instability less important to them. Foreign
direct investors are unlikely to withdraw their
investment unless things get extremely bad
and they decide to leave a market for good.
As a result, foreign direct investment is a
much more stable source of capital for
developing countries than portfolio
investment. Albuquerque (2003) shows that
while long-term financing inflows to East
Asia fell by 22 per cent in the wake of the
1997 crisis, FDI inflows fell only 5 per cent.
Similar results for Latin America (1980s) and
Mexico (1994) indicate that FDI provides
security for emerging market countries in
terms of investment funding. Further, falls in
foreign direct investment inflows appear to
recover quickly—inflows to Mexico had fully
recovered within three years of the 1994 debt
crisis. FDI inflows are more stable and less
prone to capital flight, and this is particularly
so for emerging market economies. As a
result, it is important for developing
economies to maximise their opportunities
to attract FDI and create an environment
conducive to investment.
FDI in Papua New Guinea has been
erratic over the last three decades, with the
fairly steady growth observed between 1976–
83 replaced by a series of peaks and troughs
(Figure 1). Papua New Guinea, with its rich
natural resources, is the only Pacific island
country to receive significant FDI inflows, but
while the amount of capital has increased
over the period, it has failed to keep pace with
the overall rate of growth in inflows to
developing countries. Global foreign invest-
ment flows have grown significantly since
0
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Figure 1 FDI inflows to Papua New Guinea, 1970–2003 (US$ million)
Source: UNCTAD Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment 2005.
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1970. Between 1970 and 2003, foreign
investment inflows grew around 170 per cent,
with the developed world growing around
114 per cent. However, it was the developing
world where the most growth took place—a
massive 366 per cent increase. In 1970, FDI
to Papua New Guinea made up 3.5 per cent
of global FDI flows to developing
economies—by 2003, this had fallen to less
than 0.06 per cent (Figure 2). Even near the
peak of investment in 1995, FDI to Papua
New Guinea made up only 0.51 per cent of
global FDI flows. The most significant
investments, relative to other developing
countries, were made in the four years before
independence. Since then, the ratio has
dropped significantly and other developing
countries, particularly those in Asia, have
taken the lion’s share of investment.
While Papua New Guinea is still the
most significant destination for foreign
investment in the Pacific, it ranks 49 of 150
developing countries for total investment
inflows between 1990 and 2003 (Table 1). It
is also evident that the internal security
issues often given as the cause of Papua New
Guinea’s lack of investment do not tell the
full story. Indonesia, Venezuela, Columbia
and Nigeria all have at least four times
Papua New Guinea’s investment inflows: all
have more pressing internal stability issues
than Papua New Guinea (AON 2005). While
security is a disincentive to some investors,
there is also substantial evidence that
investors will invest in a politically and
economically unstable country if the rewards
are seen to outweigh the risks. Several
managers commented that security is a cost
to business, but one on which they plan—by
hiring security staff, taking out insurance,
and so on. While a major cost and concern,
and certainly a negative in terms of lifestyle,
this did not seem to be a reason to cease
operations or to discourage new ones.
Of Dunning’s (1993) four motivations for
foreign investment, only two appear truly
Source: UNCTAD Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment 2005.
Figure 2 Ratio of Papau New Guinea’s FDI inflows to developing economy inflows,
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active in Papua New Guinea: resource-
seeking investment centred on mining,
logging and fishing; and market-seeking
investment, the aim of which is to market
products to host country consumers. Of these
two, resource-seeking investment
overwhelmingly dominates.
But it is another motivation for foreign
investment, efficiency-seeking investment,
that underpins an export-led growth strategy.
Efficiency-seeking investment aims to
capitalise on the strategic advantages of a
country, typically labour supply, technology
and economies of scale, to produce goods for
the international market. Host countries for
efficiency-seeking investment need to have
well-developed and open cross-border
markets, with efficient transportation
infrastructure that readily accesses the
markets for goods being produced. The
government’s export-led growth strategy
might therefore be regarded as an optimistic
attempt to stimulate economic development.
While the government is attempting to
encourage domestic processing operations,
it seems unlikely that these will eventuate
without the presence of significant
efficiencies in the Papua New Guinea
economy. The greatest obstacles to efficiency-
seeking investment are generally regarded
as a poor supply of skilled and semi-skilled
labour and high transportation costs.
While Papua New Guinea is far from the
least open economy in the World Bank’s
(2005) survey, the impediments to trade are
no doubt exacerbated by high freight costs
and poor servicing, corruption within the
freight management bureaucracy and overly
bureaucratic processes designed to protect
domestic industry. It will require significant
structural reform for trade logistics to be able
to compete with more cost-effective destinations
for efficiency-seeking investment.1
Additionally, the skills base of Papua
New Guinea has some structural problems
that impede business activities. Numerous
managers highlighted the problems caused
by the cycles of the mining industry—in the
words of Robert De Brouwere, of James
Barnes PNG Ltd, ‘mines blow everyone out
of the water’ (De Browere 2005). Skilled
tradespeople are in high demand on mining
operations: as a result, when the mining
industry is experiencing a boom, manu-
facturing operations are unable to compete
with the salaries offered and frequently lose
key staff. When staff return from working at
the mines, they anticipate similar wages to
those paid by the mining companies. The
inability, and/or unwillingness, of
manufacturers to pay these rates creates
frictions as the workers re-assimilate in the
urban manufacturing environment. The pool
of highly-skilled tradespeople is small: many
were trained by the Bougainville mining
operation that has since closed, and
government training facilities are unable to
provide graduates of the quality or quantity
required at peak mining periods. Several
managers commented on the poor quality of
training provided by the technical colleges
in Papua New Guinea. Additionally, a small
manufacturing base means that there are few
tradespeople with specialised skills in new
technologies, requiring manufacturers to
import staff, typically from Australia, at great
expense. The lack of a self-sustaining
manufacturing base means that efficiency-
seeking investors are unlikely to locate to
Papua New Guinea when it is far easier to
find such staff in alternative Asian
destinations. This merely exacerbates the
skilled staffing problems for existing
manufacturing businesses in Papua New
Guinea.2
Considering the current profile of foreign
investment in the country, it is possibly overly
optimistic to envisage an expansion of the
export base without a significant structural
shift in the business environment. Export
development must be based on a country’s
comparative advantages, and successful
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export-led growth strategies have taken place
in countries with significant economies of
scale that foreign investors are able to exploit.
Export-led growth in East Asian countries,
where it has been most effective, has typically
begun in low-cost manufacturing and
increased to high-technology production as
the skill and technology base of the country
increased. Japan, Korea, Taiwan and more
recently China and Vietnam have followed
this pattern, with manufacturing moving to
more cost-effective locations as the skill and
income base of the population rises.
The concept of investment hubs has been
used to good effect by a number of countries,
most recently China, which created a number
of ‘export processing zones’ which have
since become the centre of Chinese trade on
the east coast. Investment hubs, or clusters,
are specialised concentrations of firms with
operational synergies, able to take advantage
of a pool of infrastructure and resources (both
human and otherwise) that grow and
strengthen as more companies join the hub.
Spillover effects mean that there is significant
long-term advantage to be gained by joining
a cluster, and that accelerated growth is
possible. Business studies have recognised
clusters as drivers of innovation, facilitating
business development by increasing the
productivity of the companies in the cluster,
and by stimulating new businesses (Porter
1998). Yehoue (2005) creates a model that
suggests that the accelerated economic growth
of some developing countries may be
explained by clusters that have established
organically, and proposes that policies
directed toward the establishment of clusters
could generate significant economic gains by
host countries, both by attracting foreign
investment and stimulating domestic
enterprise.
However, a by-product of government
incentives for industry development in
Papua New Guinea seems to be a desire to
replicate business successes as widely as
possible—several interviewees repeated
stories of bureaucratic visions of ‘a tuna
factory in every port’,3 mimicking the ‘meat
cannery in every town’ scenario of the late
1980s that saw the establishment, and
subsequent departure, of competitors to the
previously monopoly-assured James Barnes
PNG Ltd.4 If an export-led growth strategy is
to be pursued, it is likely that development
hubs will be required if manufacturing
business is to grow, diversify and remain
viable. A manufacturing hub, most likely in
Lae, with appropriate technical training
support would be an obvious choice, and a
canning hub is already evident in Madang.
A more focused approach to the development
of hubs with core competencies, well-trained
skilled and semi-skilled labour and supporting
infrastructure may assist in promulgating an
export-led growth scenario. Certainly this
would be preferable to an ad hoc development
strategy seemingly designed for political
purposes. Articulating and promoting a
cohesive industry development strategy,
incorporating plans for promoting an
efficient logistics infrastructure and the
development of a pool of technically skilled
workers, would be an effective first step by
the bureaucracy.
The outlook for the next few years is
promising. Official inflation is low, and
quarterly changes have been below 2 per cent
since June 2003 (Bank of Papua New Guinea
2005), possibly a result of the Bank of Papua
New Guinea following and ‘inflation
targeting lite’ management strategy (Bowman
2006:6). Currency devaluation has made
wages more competitive with neighbouring
economies than in the past, and has
stimulated import substitution and made
some domestically produced products more
competitive. Mining revenues are expected
to improve the Government of Papua New
Guinea’s fiscal position, and give the
Government an opportunity to implement
reform programs. The immediate future
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represents an opportunity for Papua New
Guinea to move forward: whether this
promise can be fulfilled will depend on the
determination of the government and its
people.
Notes
1 Surprisingly, Papua New Guinea is included
in the top 50 per cent of 155 countries
surveyed in the World Bank ‘Doing Business’
surveys. At number 64 in 2005, it beat
neighbouring business locations such as
Indonesia (115), the Philippines (113) and
Vietnam (99). Disturbingly, Solomon Islands
is ranked higher at 53, and Kiribati at 45,
which may cast some doubt on the usefulness
of the measures employed in the survey, as
while there may have fewer business
regulations, business is far from thriving in
either country.
2 One positive note: a number of business
people employing large numbers of
unskilled workers believe that their staff are
as productive and cost-effective as any found
in Asian countries. The widely held
Australian belief that Papua New Guinea
workers are unwilling or unable to compete
with Asian workers, both in terms of
productivity and work practices, may be
more a matter of perception than fact. The
decline in the value of the kina against Asian
currencies has done much to improve this
situation, and further devaluations of the
kina should be regarded as beneficial to the
business environment, particularly in terms
of making wages more regionally cost-
competitive.
3 There is already fish processing in every port:
South Seas Tuna in Wewak, RD Cannery in
Madang and Frabelle in Lae.
4 Having been awarded a 10-year monopoly,
James Barnes PNG Ltd was surprised to
discover that Huttons, based in Lae, and Ox
and Palm, based in Port Moresby, were
setting up operations before the first can had
been produced by the Madang Globe factory
(De Brouwere 2005). Huttons subsequently
ceased operations.
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